>> join us in just about one hour for remarks from president obama on proposed changes to government surveillance programs , specifically from the national security agency. he will speak at the justice department, and you can see that live right here on c-span at 11:00 eastern. later this afternoon, the brookings institution hosted a discussion on the president's remarks with a former cia analyst and bush -- british defense official could we will have that live at 2:00 p.m., also here on c-span. we got a preview of the president's speech earlier today. let's take a look. grid what should we expect to hear from the

president? guest: host: we are here with -- is that the president will breach the spirit of reform while only making minor, incremental changes. biggeriving the decisions back to congress. host: what are those incremental decisions? guest: he could place new limits on the collection of phone data. that was the most controversial program. that would be around the edges. he will not shift the collection of this data to telecoms. he will introduce new privacy protections.

course, another one of the most controversial revelations from snowden was that we got a -- he europeans upset could push for some constitutional advocate. host: a lot of the talk and recommendations deal with section 215, what is that? guest: that is the section of the patriot act that the nsa has used to allow them to scoop the president's remarks will be live at 11:00. we have a facebook western post--- facebook question p

osted. what do you want to hear from the president today? facebook.com/cspan. let's bring you a portion of her recent senate judiciary committee hearing looking at surveillance issues. this happened earlier this week. senator grassley is going to be joining us. we have a roll call vote soon but i want to get this started, and when the vote occurs at some

point come weekend recess for a few minutes while we go and vote . what is important about this hearing, we are going to hear from the president's review group on intelligence and communications technology. i was talking briefly with him in the back, and i know this is the first time they have appeared together publicly since the groundbreaking report was released last month, and i thank them, as i know the president and others have for taking the time, a lot of time and effort, to prepare this report. we know what the technology is today. etherof us can predict wha there will be five to 10 years from now. war and data will be created by all of us as -- more and more

data will be created by all of us as each day passes. the questions are obvious -- when should our government be allowed to collect and use that data? what will the answer to these questions need for privacy and in the 21stion century? all three branches of government are grappling with the nsa posturing a collection of phone records -- with whether to let collection of phone records continue. the bill across the spectrum want us to have this debate and want to have a clear is goingding of what on, so we want as much as we can in a public hearing. all of us on this committee have had access, as well as the five witnesses, to highly classified

matters, but we will go into as much as we can in open session. the most critical factor with whether to conduct any intelligence activity is an assessment of its value. it is a particularly important value in the phone records program conducted under section 215 of the patriot act. as i've said repeatedly, i've concluded that this phone record program is not uniquely valuable enough to justify a massive intrusion on americans privacy. the review group likewise concluded the program is not quoteial -- i will the review group rate "the collection of metadata was not essential to preventing attacks and could have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional orders." later, they say

section 215 is generated relevant information in only a small number of cases and there has been no incidents in which the nsa can say with confidence that the outcome would have been 215erent without section metadata program. nothing in section 215 as interpreted by the fifa court would preclude mass election beyond phone records. the privacy and locations of this sort of massive surveillance at the privacy and theations of the sort of -- privacy and locations of the sort of massive surveillance can't be overstated. i think it is a critically important question, given that many of our surveillance laws depend up on distinction between the 2. -- the insights are important as we take up reform to the national security

letter statutes. using them, the fbi can obtain detailed information about communication records and financial transactions. the thing that is troubling to many is the recipients are subject to permanent gag orders. senator durbin and i have been trying to impose additional safeguards on this controversial authority for years, to limit their use and to ensure that the gag orders comply with the amendment and to provide recipients with a meaningful opportunity for judicial review, something that most americans would assume already exist. series ofhas a important recommendations that change the way national security letters operate. we have not seen as much about these recommendations, and the

press is not generated as much attention, but they should. we have to look at it. the report also recommends creating an institutional public interest advocate at the fifa court. i strongly support the proposal. the stakes are high. you think about it, we are really having a debate about americans fundamental relationship with her own government. the government exists for americans, not the other way around. about whether the government should have the power to create massive databases of information about its citizens. it is a feeling i have no matter who is the head of our government. must imposegly we

stronger limits on government surveillance powers and i am americansthat most agree with me. having said that, we want to do it right. on our panel today, we will have , chairman of the board of governors of the middle east institute. during his 30 years of public service, is a senior white house national security adviser to presidents george h.w. bush, where i first met him, though clinton, and george w. bush. recentlyichael morell, retired deputy director of the central intelligence agency after more than 30 use of service. during that time he served as acting director. he earned his bachelors degree akron andniversity of a masters degree from georgetown

. geoffrey stone serves as a professor at the university of chicago law school, previously clerked for supreme court justice william brennan, and the professor also serves as the dean of the university of chicago law school and provost of the university. ein is currently a professor at harvard law school. previously served as administered are of the office of information and migratory affairs. he served as an attorney at the was a law of justice, clerk to supreme court justice thurgood marshall. a professor at the georgia institute of technology, previously at ohio state university's college of law. he was named the cochair of the do not track standards process of the worldwide web consortium could he served as the clinton administration's chief counsel

on privacy from 1999 to 2001. gentlemen, do you have a particular why you want to proceed? >> after a consultation with your staff, we have a very brief opening statement, if that is agreeable to you, chairman. ,on-withstanding our diversity you just a signal, we began the process with great admiration for the intelligence intelligence community, and we want to start by honoring their great work you keeping the nation safe. terrorism and associated threats are real and one of our main goals has been to suggest reforms that are compatible with combating those risks. after extensive discussions and s during the last month, the gratitude and admiration we have for the intelligence community has

increased as a result of interacting with them. the highest levels of professionalism, no evidence of political or religious targeting, or targeting of people because of political dissent. their focus is generally been on national security. forre also grateful to them their help and cooperation on a very tight time schedule, and they provided us with great access to information making our report possible. we also grateful for many organizations and individuals, over 2 thousand, in fact, who en, inth -- over 2 doz fact, who met with us, concerned with liberties, freedom of the press, the rights of journalists, our relations with other nations, friendly nations and some that aren't particularly friendly but ensuring our relations are cooperative as possible. tell us organizations and individuals have devoted energy and time to -- countless organizations and individuals have devoted energy and time to work and we are grateful to

them. which of our focus has been on maintaining the ability of the intelligence community to do what it needs to do. if there is one thing to emphasize, it is this, not one of the recognitions in our report would compromise or jeopardize that ability in any way. on the contrary, many of the recommendations with strength and that ability explicitly by increasing safeguards against insider threats and by eliminating certain gaps in the law that make it harder to track people under circumstances we have reason to believe they don't wish to do us well. in terms of the reforms we favor , just three very general points -. the first is the immense importance of a free and open internet. across partisan lines there is a commitment to internet freedom, and what is done in this domain we believe should be compatible with that commitment. the second is the importance of risk management, signaled, i

think, mr. chairman, by her opening remarks. that is a central unifying theme. concerning multiple risks, first and foremost the risk to national security, but including also the risk to public trust, , risk torivacy economic values, and democratic self-governance. what our report tries to thread the needle on is to ensure a full set of risks are taken into account, and that we aren't optimizing only along one dimension. the third point is the importance of accountability, which is a unifying theme for our 46 recognitions. accountability to senior-level , accountability to the legal system, congress, this committee, trance pants and disclosure, and above all, to the american people through caret -- through transparency and disclosure. one form of accountability includes steps that would

increase public trust not just within the united states, but throughout the world. --s is a device group diverse group, as noted. by agreement, there are no dissent, no horse trading, no, rising. -- no compromise and. >> you would never make it in the senate. [laughter] >> if our arithmetic is right, we have 230 votes. .1000 or even comes close, and is out trance middle letter makes clear to the committee and the american people, we offer recommendations ,or the great deal of humility and as a mere part of the process, prominently including the judgments of this committee. we look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much.

a couple things are extraordinary here. one, that you did reach such consensus. i wish we could reach the same kind of consensus in the senate. in many things we do, but not enough. secondly, your comments about the professionalism of our intelligence -- the men and women of the various intelligence communities. i totally agree with you. without going into the subject of our closed-door briefings, both republicans and democrats praise the work of some of the things he has had to bring before us, some very critical matters. withspent enough time stations chiefs around the world

in different places and realize how important is the work that they all do. phone records program was made public last year, there were some who immediately began arguing the program was critical to national security. cited 54 terrorist plots being thwarted. you have had a chance to review those, as i have. i read the report and i reached the same conclusion that others here did, that the section 215 program contributed only to a few of those cases and was not essential in preventing any terrorist attacks. that is put a record. -- put to record. it is also important to look at another thing we keep hearing, programehow if this were in place before 9/11 it could have prevented it. , you were senior

counterterrorism official at the time of the attacks. what did the bulk phone records program prevent -- with the bulk phone records program have prevented 9/11? >> senator, i think it is impossible to go back and reconstruct history. history is interesting academically, it is difficult to say with accuracy if one fact had been changed, the outcome would have been significantly different. ifhink we can say this, that the information that the federal agencies had at the time had been shared among the agencies, then one of them, the fbi, could and gone to the fisa court could have in a very timely manner gotten a warrant to monitor the appropriate telephones. they didn't because they were unaware of information that

existed elsewhere in the government of the time. -- at the time. but there was a period of over 2 years where that information was available. it would have been possible in a very timely manner to get a warrant from the fisa court. >> wasn't that one of the things that senator graham in his review committee found was sharing? >> the joint committee, the 2 intelligence committees of the house and senate, found that the information was in the government at the time. it just wasn't shared. >> i raise the issue of national security letters, and a ce -- nsl's. for those who are not familiar, they permit the government to get in searching to medications and financial records without a court order. -- insurgent communications and financial records without court order. the fbi can impose a permanent gag order on nsl recipients.

and number of us have been trying to reform that. haven't hadndations as much attention as other topics covered by the report, but i think they are just as important. professor swire, how did the review group arrived at its conclusions regarding nsl's? >> thank you, mr. chairman. -- the group it amongst us includes 3 law legal matters one we were particularly involved. we went to the fbi and interviewed fbi counsel in detail. we also amongst us had worked quite a bit on issues related to nsl's previously. of the things we focused on was the so-called gag orders or nondisclosure orders. in the criminal world, when there is an organized crime investigation, there is often

nondisclosure orders on the order of 45 to 60 days. we found out that they are either permanent or come up for review for the first time in 50 years under current law for nsl's. that is very different from the way that grand jury subpoenas or investigations on the criminal side happened. the lack of disclosure and the long, long period of secrecy is one thing we were concerned about. >> does not create -- doesn't that create a real problem in some cases for the person receiving this nsl, the gag order? >> it poses problems for the e-mail providers and phone companies who received the msl -- nsl, where they are not in a position to describe the activities they're taking. that can lead to situations where, among other things, the facts might be quite reasonable if understood broadly. many providers have exposed concerned that they come under this gag order, cannot reassure customers about the practices that exist. that is been a concern for the

industry, certainly. >> let me, before i yield to senator grassley, let me ask you -- some would say that the nsl is like a grand jury subpoena. you can have the gag order. there is not judicial review, and so on. do you agree with that i?mportant discussion as we move section where we recommend a certain process that is more consistent with the normal one for getting access to people's records. we think that if 215 has the structure that it should, the national security letter should follow the same structure that the separation between them is extremely hard to justify. there is a certain analogy to the administrative subpoena. there is a question of breath and scope with respect to national security letters. we think that given the to treat exception,

the national security letter like a 215 record seeking would not compromise any national security goal. >> thank you. ,nd thanks, senator grassley for letting me post just one more question. morell.ay this to mr. we have heard some government officials talk about section 215 programs and say that we shouldn't -- americans shouldn't be concerned about it, because the phone records the nsa obtains are just metadata and a not particularly sensitive. the review group said that there posed by theks government obtaining massive amounts of metadata. could you elaborate on that a limited? -- a little bit? >> one of the things i learned

in this process, that i came to realize in this process, mr. chairman, is that there is quite a bit of content in metadata. when you have the records of the phone calls that a particular individual made, you can learn an awful lot about that person. that is one of the things that struck me. there is not, in my mind, a sharp distinction between metadata and content. it is more of a continuum. times" op-edw york , "the government should end of this program for obtaining metadata. the current program contains risks to public privacy and civil liberties." the concern i have had and some others have had, no matter who is president or who is the head of these agencies, we don't want the temptation in their to misuse it.

senator grassley, thank you for .oming over i note that senators have been enjoying -- we are all told that there will be a vote or 2:30. going toy that is not happen. if you look over your head, there are the white dots on the clock that say when the next one might be. senator grassley, go ahead. >> the chairman explain what i just wanted to explain, that you folks may not think this is an important hearing, but it is an important hearing, but you may not conclude that because other members are not here. we were told that there would be a vote at 2:30. before i ask weston's, i have an opportunity to give an opening statement. i thank all of you for being here and for your work on the committee. this is the latest in a series on government surveillance that our committee has held. the nsa continues to be of great concern to my constituents and many across the country. the most important response ability of government is to

protect our national security while at the same time preserving our civil liberties. this is a responsibility that is quite hard to meet. rapid changes in technology are making our enemies more lethal, our world more interconnected, our privacy more subject to possible intrusion. under these circumstances, it is useful to hear a variety of perspectives, including from those outside the government. i thank the members of the review board for your service. some of the conclusions of the report may help clarify the issues before us as we consider possible reforms. "although recent disclosures and commentaries have created the impression in some quarters that the nsa surveillance is across the globe, that is not the case." "we the report concludes

have not uncovered any official ororts to suppress dissent to intrude into people's private lives without legal justification." none of this means that the potential of abuse for these authorities shouldn't concern us. it should. or that the nsa has made serious mistakes, or that the law in this area can be improved -- couldn't be improved. there is a place for additional transparency, safeguards, oversight. but these conclusions are helpful in clarifying the issues . second, the report recommends that "the national security of the united states depends upon continued capacity of the nsa and other agencies to collect .ssential information in considering proposals for reform now and for the future, policymakers should avoid the and takingrreaction

care in making changes that could undermine capability of the intelligence community." that is very good advice, folks. one recommendation that may affect this advice is to review group's proposal to preserve the government's controversial ability to query telephone metadata but with some changes. one of those recommended cha nges -- it is an interesting idea perhaps worth investigating. but i think it is legitimate to have concern that it may create as many privacy problems as it solves. indeed, private companies seem to be allowing the customers information to be hacked on what seems to be a daily basis. just as importantly, i am concerned that in other instances, the review group may have not followed its own advice. some of its other recommendations may seriously threaten our national security if adopted collectively.

theple, some of recommendations and the report appeared to make it more difficult to investigate a terrorist than a common criminal. some appeared to some appear to rebuild the wall between the law enforcement and national security impunity's before -- communities before 2001. that will help to contribute to our inability to threat and thwart the attacks that happened on that date. i do not mean to critic rise -- criticize the efforts, but i am concerned the group was given a short hunt to do their work as result. i understand the group spent only one day at the nsa, and if i'm wrong you can correct it. i am concerned that the group lacks some important perspectives. none of the members has experience in supervising terrorism investigations at the

department of justice or fbi. i am concerned group reduced a large number of recommendations but did not develop some of them fully. as a review group wrote, it's recommendations, it will require careful assessment i a wide range of officials with close reference to the consequences. has pretty good advice. i look forward to beginning that process today. i have a question for the doctor. after the review group issued its report, you wrote an opinion piece in which you emphasized report recommends changing that telephony metadata for graham rather -- program. you wrote, had the program been in place more than a decade ago, it would have prevented the september 11 terror attacks. further, you wrote the program

has the potential to prevent the next 9/11. i would like to have you expend on why you hold those two opinions, and can you give us specific examples of how metadata programs are valuable to you when you headed cia? >> [indiscernible] >> press the button. >> the reason i wrote the op-ed with regard to 215 is i felt there was a misperception on the part of the media and much in the american public that the review group had indeed recommended an end to the program. we did not do that. we recommended a change in approach. that was the main reason i read the op ed, to make that clear. it is absolutely true that the program has not played a

significant program in disrupting any terrorist attacks to this point. that is a different statement than saying the program is not important. the program only has to be successful once to be invaluable. and it does carry the potential going forward to prevent a attack on the united states, and that was a point i was trying to make. i believe it. another point i will make, mr. chairman, is when we talked about this as a group, there is a value in a negative query of 215 data. if you have a terse overseas who is talking about an attack and you do not know where that attack is going to be, it is invaluable to query the 215 database, and if the answer is he does not have contacts, that gives you reassurance that the attack will not be here.

we talked about that in the report. that is another important point. >> i can. question, but let me read a lead in. one of the changes your report romance is the metadata program is a private third hardy or parties hold the metadata. we have seen recent instances where companies like target and neiman marcus have been unable to protect private data among like in situations i would be concerned about privacy. anyone of you, hopefully not all, because i want to ask one more question, what was the assessment of the privacy risk associated with your recommendation that the metadata be stored in private hands, and did you speak to the telephone companies to explore whether they're willing or able to hold the metadata? thee did speak with companies about that, and they would rather not hold that the

that. our judgment about the government holding the data is the primary danger of the 215 program is not that it is used only in the way in which its uses is authorized, but it is sitting out there a huge amount of personal information about americans that could be abused in awful ways. thatuestion, how to avoid potential abuse. one of the ways we decided it makes sense to avoid that is taking it out of the hands of government. government can do far more harm if it abuses information in its possession than private entities. our judgment was that the government should not have position of this information because if it does there is the possibility of someone coming along down the road, seeing it is a great opportunity to get lyrical dirt on an individual, on organizations, associations,

and that is a danger we want to avoid. usefulve that data is and the idea was to find a way that would enable the government to have access to the data, but minimize the risk that it could be abused. our judgement was that keeping it in private hands, the risk would be less than the kind of abuse that we were historically concerned about with the government. >> one of the things i was concerned about, not rebuild the wall that exists between our law enforcement among national security commissions -- communities before september 11. part of that is making sure we do not make it harder to investigate a terrorism case and any other type of crime. the fbi director weighed in last week or are proposed to the national security system. he called these letters a very important tool that is essential

to the work of the fbi. he also stated, what worries me about the suggested that we impose a judicial process on ns l's is it would make it harder for us to do a national security investigation than bank fraud investigation. question -- maybe somebody else more appropriate -- why would we want to make it harder for ages and prosecutors to investigate is the notch and terrorism than other crimes? did you discuss this with the fbi director? art your recommendations almost exactly the same as -- aren't your recommendations almost exactly the same as was recommended to this committee in 2007 long before the recent controversy about an essay? -- nsa. >> it is true i wrote on fisa

prior to that. we went to the fbi and the fbi longer stand us and we met with mr. comey last week. it was an extensive discussion. any criminal investigation, you have all the criminal powers, and you may have the nsl and foreign intelligence authorities. one difference is in a criminal investigation, if there is a mistake, that comes to light. if you have 50 years of secrecy, we do not find out what the government is doing. because of the risk of long- running secrecy, some safeguards are appropriate for these secret foreign intelligence things. that is one difference that exists. >> thank you. i wanted to yield to the chair of the senate intelligence 20. i want to place in the record a detailed report from the new

american foundation that concludes the executive branch's effectiveness of the section 215 phone records is misleading, and other research that concludes that section 215 pulled records is only of marginal value. i will place this in the record. i want to say how much we appreciate that senator feinstein is a member of this -- and we have her expertise, and the other members who serve on the intelligence committee. >> thank you. i appreciate those comments. i would like to submit a statement for the record, if i may. >> i would like to ask for something to be put into the record. objection, these may be made art of record. >> thank you.

mr. chairman, the intelligence committee and virtually every member who was there, perhaps missing one, had the opportunity talking to the professorial element of this committee last week. the intelligence all of it was not there, and we very much regret that mr. clark and mr. were not there. particularly for your ears, i think what we thought in reading the report and listening to the testimony was that the group did not want the program to continue . and then i read your op-ed piece in "the wall street journal" -- excuse me in "the washington post

we did not do that. we called for a change in approach rather than a wholesale rejection to better protect the privacy and civil liberties of americans, key values of our republic. read recommended the government no longer -- we recommended the government no longer hold the data and that it be required to obtain an individual court order for each search. make no mistake the month review group reaffirmed that the program should remain a tool of our government in the fight against terrorism. then you go on him another misperception involved is the review group's view of the efficacy of section 215. many commentators said it found program.in the to report accurately said the program has not been essential, and i want to talk about the word "essential," to preventing attacks since its creation, but

that is not the same thing as saying the program is not important to national security, urges why we did not recommend its elimination. that?ire, you agree with >> there were 14 things there. i was trying to write them down. yes, i'm going to the private sector and keeping the program. order for eachrt search. the last part was not that it was useful to have that information from the program, roughly speaking -- i agree with that also. >> i agree with every word. >> professor stone? >> i agree [indiscernible] it is possible that in the

future their world be an instance in which 215 if it exists will be able to prevent a major attack. our judgment is it has value that way. >> mr. clark, welcome. it is good to see you again. yes or no? >> senator, i think we are surprisingly all in agreement. >> good, that is what i wanted to know. they keep. now the word "essential." this is a word that is debated as to its meaning. we have one recent court decision out of the southern district of new york, and i would like to read from page 48 of that opinion. the effectiveness of bulk telephony metadata collection cannot be seriously disputed. offering examples is a dangerous strategy for the government, because it discloses means and methods of intelligence gathering. onlydisclosures ancan educate government's enemies.

in declarations that are part of the record in this case -- in for court's view, think out -- they offer ample justification. then it goes into al qaeda associated terrorists in pakistan connected with an unknown person in the united states. 25215 camey, where in, nsa was able to provide a previously unknown number of one of the co-conspirators. the next one is january of 2009. connectedin yelmen with someone in texas. nsa notify the fbi which plot toed a pot to -- a attack the new york stock exchange. was used to help

identify connections. accused were convicted. in october 2009, while monitoring al qaeda terrorists, and is a discovered david headley, who is a major figure who was working on a plot to bomb a danish newspaper office that had published cartoons depicting the prophet mohammed. it goes on from there. is a wordessential" that is often debated. you also say that it was likely this could have prevented 9/11 and it could anotherssibly event 9/11. am i correct about that? morrell? >> we as a group -- >> i'm asking about what you said in the op ed. >> we never talked about that as

a group. >> it was just your opinion. >> it was my opinion. >> general alexander testified in 2009 nsa did in fact go to the fisa court and found that it took nine days average to be able to collect the information that was necessary. are you aware of that? >> no, ma'am. >> that is according to testimony according to general allen. my time is up, is that what you're saying? would you let me finish? >> of course. >> i really appreciated. thank you. he can be very strict. fact in used after the the boston bombing. but here is the difference -- in boston they use emergency powers and were able to get information quickly. this is used to prevent an

attack. itthose of us that see important to prevent another attack -- i do not need to tell you, terrorist rooms have metastasized, they will come after us if they can, there is a real with any of fact -- the question comes, do you not find substantial value in being able to prevent this attack? >> so i find substantial banal in any tool that helps us prevent attacks. i believe 215 carries the potential to prevent attacks, and that is why i think it needs to continue. one of the important issues i think is the question of not reallyr us did impact our view on the change in approach to the program. believe that we are going to add a substantial

burden to the government by making the changes we are suggesting. if something cannot be done quicker than nine days, they to makemake changes that happen. we ripped into the report and emergency provision so that in emergency situations, when the intelligence community needs they need --need to move quickly, they can get the data without court order, going to the court after the fact. thank you very much. that you werete not here for the part of the testimony when we were talking about 9/11. one of the big problems there is we had information that could have prevented 9/11. the people with it did not communicate as they should have. i recall a number of -- some of the information we had finally being translated a week or two after the event. ?enator lee

>> i'm told my colleague from south carolina needs to go. endeavor to him, i will let him go first. >> do you want to give him that much difference? >> i have always liked utah. >> senator graham? >> thank you. >> please go next, and then we will go to senator blumenthal and then back to senator lee and then back to senator franken and senator cruz. pick up on what the chairman said. michael, you wrote an op-ed you think that this technology had been in place before 9/11 could have helped prevent the attack. that is your personal opinion? >> yes sir. >> how many people agree with that? raise your hand. >> i would think the reason we

are not raising our hand is not are notdisagree, but we specialists in the details of 9/11. >> fair enough. did, whenst said they i read it. >> we will just go with what you said. >> we agreed with the quotation senator feinstein read from mr. post" op- "washington ed. we did not discuss 9/11 as a group. >> we will take what they said. we will agree with you. bottom line, let's get way at foot level. do you believe as a group we are at war with radical islam? >> i do. >> how many of believe you are at war? the difference between assigning a crime and a war, there are

fundamental differences. you agree with that? intelligence tethering is a very important will in fighting a war. you agree with that? >> that is the theme of our report. >> what i am trying to let the nation no, what you are trying to do, we are trying to find a way to fight a war within our values him and this is an unusual situation. there is no capital to conquer. there's no navy to sink. there's no air force to shoot down. we are fighting an ideology. if you believe the enemy does not mind dying -- that is their first price -- we have got to hit them before they hit us. is that generally a thought process here we have got to before sinceattack they will not be deterred by death? >> yes. >> and were all a lucky, an american citizen in yemen.

how did we miss the fact that a major in the united states army was communicating with him? we got all these programs and everybody is wanting to revisit these programs, which i understand. we have a major in the united states army that ended up killing 19 people that was openly talking for the whole chiefto see, one of the suspects of the world in yemen. how did we miss that and what can we do to make sure we do not miss that in the future? understand the thrust of the question. our recommendations do not take away the ability of the government to use the balk telephony metadata program. ship where it stays, from government to private sources. we take court orders.

as we make clear in the report, we believe it is critical to protect the national security of united states. >> the fact that nobody can answer the question, i understand reforming the program and trying to be more sensitive to privacy concerns, but no one is talking about the fact that you had a major in the army on active duty openly communicating with a known terrorist following -- >> we have a section that talks about how the same internet, the same artwork, used in afghanistan and iraq are used back home. when it comes to the surveillance on hardware and software over there, the same software and hardware here, and previous to be true in wars. how we build an internet at war and at home is -- awlaki analogy, if he

is calling someone, we have a cell phone. if he is calling someone in the united states, the program after the changes you're recommending, can it still pick that up? >> yes. >> what a court order be necessary? >> unless there was an emergency, yes. >> you agree that you do not need a court order to surveilled the enemy in a time of war? >> overseas yes. not in the united states. >> do you believe that he would fit the definition of an enemy combatant? >> we would want to look at that. the legal authorities on that. you do not disagree with it. point, youin believe we can pick up that the call? >> yes. >> good.

if somebody is calling him from the united states, can we pick up that phone call and do something about it? if not 215, it is 702. >> most americans do not care about the titles. >> but it is relevant to the ruminations, because in 702 we keep the same structure as it has today. >> can you reassure us that if somebody in the united states is calling a known terrorist in yemen we can pick that up and do something about it? >> yes. >> at the end of the day, isn't that what we are trying to do? aren't we trying to find out who is talking to who when the doing, one of the people the talking is somebody we are worried about attacking the nation him and we are not trying to do anything more than that? >> yes, senator, and that is an important point because it applies both domestically, where

there are concerns about monitoring of american citizens, that do not fit our ends, but also internationally when the focus on the situations you are discussing and not picking up people's private communications. >> thank you. >> i appreciate you knowing the and 215.e between 702 and 21 72 i would say to my friend senator graham we ought to look at the adequate safeguards are especially in dealing with an agency that did not have adequate enough safeguards to keep a subcontractor from stealing millions and millions and millions of files and he is still out today after spending millions of dollars, do not know everything that he did steal. i just do not want to get lured .y all the technology we have, we saw the same thing in nsa

when the state department and fileslitary, all kinds of , a private first class first class to go in and download all c.d.'s and cause enormous gold is for the united when these highly classified cables from our ambassadors were made public. senator blumenthal? >> thank you, mr. chairman. think of rolling this hearing. thank you for each of you for having your impressive work. you have elevated and provided andibility to very specific very significant proposals that in our the reform effort intelligence-gathering operations. thetor graham referred to

present effort to counter terrorism as a war. there is a saying, an adage, intruded to the romans by classic education. my classic education is not good enough to know. it says that law is the first casualty in war. you have provided a really profound and important service and making sure we do not have in youras you say report, it is the first thing stated, the united states wants to different forms of security. national security of personal privacy. there's a reason why courts matter, why the founders of our nation thought they mattered. they wanted to prevent general warrants and secret courts, and it was one of the reasons they rebelled. s is on the's focu courts, and i have advanced and

proposed a constitutional advocate, the public interest advocate, however you want to label it, that would be independent, institutionalized, to ensure there is an adversarial proceeding never the advocate thought it was necessary, not on an ad hoc basis, not when the court thought was useful, but courts benefit from hearing both sides and from having the advocate the decide that another site should be represented. i would like to hear from you because we have heard the contrary point of view that it should the an amicus -- it should be an amicus brief, as it is sometimes called, or some other kind of ad hoc thing, and beginning with you, stating on behalf of the panel, why you chose this structure because the president is going to have to make a decision as to whether to adopt that idea, and we as a

panel and the senate will have to deliberate as well. >> history is relevant here, so there was an understanding when created that it would be basically dealing with issues of fact, like whether a justified, not with large issues of law and policy, and as the system has developed years as you're actually wear, senator, there often the judges are being asked large questions. and so an adversary proceeding in the settingd kind we're well aware somewheres, ought to when charge of deciding the public advocate is relevant. we think that's not consistent traditions. normally it isn't the case that decide.e gets to

someone who is a dedicated officer designed to protect public interest is is a very important safe guard. >> and i think that's a very important point. necessarily delay it, and some much us had knocked on judge's door literally in the middle of the night if we thought it was necessary to get warrant. and the same principle applies here, does it not? important.t's very so senator feinstein and senator rand rightly draw attention to the media sit of certain the fact that some needs coming and where you information fast, and as you say it's consistent with our traditions to accommodate situations. >> and in the short time i have remaining, perhaps i could ask elaborate a little on the

reasons why you recommended a change in the method of agree is, which i very, very important to the trust and confidence in this and i think one of the reasons for reforming the whole andem is to preserve enhance trust and confidence in the american people that we are doing both forms of security here, national security and permanent privacy. it was justice frankfurter, i may have the reference wrong, who emphasized importance of doing justice and the appearance that justice is done, and that is connected with your point. we also think particularly in the context of selection of the for the fisa court, a little diversity is a good idea and republicanic appointees, and as the report makes clear, we have all the the world for the chief justice, and have nothing intical to say about him this connection. but it just is the case that if come from one political

party in terms of the appointing president, that's awkward. to see some more diversity. >> again, it's in accord with our judicials of system that appearance and perception have to be served immense and in many respects undemocratic that courts exert, undemocratic because we believe elections generally and here we have unelected fisa court operating in secret or other members of the judiciary operate in the open, but they are unelected. so i think that your point is and again thank you all for your service to our nation. very much, senator blumenthal. the chairman of this committee has asked that we recess for minutes, and so without objection we will recess for five minutes.

[captions copyright national 2014]satellite corp. >> it's rare that a freshman from the minority party gets to like this.ceeding race go eth not to the swift. first of all, i really appreciate all of you coming here and i appreciate your willingness to serve on the group.nt's review the work that you've done has been very helpful, and i'm a lotent that it will do to frame this important forward.n, as we move

the importance of these issues overstated. one of the things that i liked pointed out in your report, appears on page 15. you pointed out an coincidence, you might call it, my word, not of securityoncept has dual meaning. tothe one hand, it refers the fact that one of the most important fundamental sacred is totions of government keep the people safe. to protect us from each other, protect us from those outside of our country who would us. security is one of the most important functions that the federal government has. and at the very same time, it refers to something different, it refers to something else that might appear to be in conflict with or create tension with that

first concept. that is the concept of security referred to in the 4th amendment, that we have the the 4th amendment to be secure. in our persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches seizures. now, this concept of what that in this be secure second respect has of course changed over time. necessarily changed as our technology has changed. principlesdamental underlying that concept of security must necessarily remain same. in order for us to remain a free order for our constitutional protections to continue to be meaningful. the things that we have struggled with as a congress and struggle with really as a country as a whole, relates to fact that where we keep our papers arewhat our

has changed, especially in the last few years. longer do our papers consist actual paper. what the founding generation papersave thought of as often exist only in the ether, the electronic equivalent of ones and zeros. are not any longer stored exclusively on hard with a finite location that might be in your home. time they exist only in a cloud somewhere. pieces of information, these papers or effects or whatever you want to call them, many instances are thins in which we have or at least should have an expectation of privacy that is reasonable, to say the very least. so we have to figure out how these twolance

sometimes conflicting interests security. with there are several ways in which this arises, but we've talked a about the today collection of metadata and the we've got an enormous amount of metadata that's been on potentially 300 million americans. the government notes that it has reviewe a rigorous process that must be followed datae anyone accesses this bates containing metadata on american.every what concerns me about that is the fact that these are basically internal operating procedures. so what is a policy today, which followed religiously for all i know today, could change tomorrow. and i'm willing to assume for purposes of this discussion that

who work atwomen the n.s.a. have nothing but our best interests at heart, i'm to assume that at least for purposes of this discussion. that might not be the case a four years from now or 10 years from now or 40 years from now. in fact, we've seen this movie before, we know how it ends. we know that eventually if that much information remains in the for thatgovernment long, it will eventually be abused. forill be manipulated partisan and otherwise nefarious purposes, and we can't let that happen. so let's start with professor stone. at this, would this be something that you would describe as one of the most compelling arguments in favor of restrictionsrobust in law, so that they're not simply in the hands of people, however well intentioned they might be, within the n.s.a.? is our i think this primary concern with respect to the collection of metadata, is

the actual use of the meta data in the ways in which it's but the risk that somewhere down the road someone to misusee out how that data. i think the safe guards that are now in place internally are actually quite good. and they're rigorous, they're multifaceted, there are checks balances, there's the senate house intelligence committee, there's inspectors general, attorneys general, the fisa court all looking over this. is even so, our judgment that it should be taken out of the hands of the government in terms of holding of the data and reduces, doesn't eliminate entirely, but reduces substantially, we think the data to beor the abused in the ways that you're talking about. and it's still a question of even therebecause there's always a risk. but our judgment is it's an reducing step towards the risk on one sigh while at the same time preserving the value of the data for national purposes. >> i think that's right. for that reason, chairman lahey

and several of my other colleague as cross the aisle have introduced legislation to in to reform this process one form or another. if i can ask one additional mr. chairman.is, some have suggested that it simply be infeasible ever to require a court order as a condition precedent for performing a query of the government data base, and let's assume for purposes of this data setn that the will remain at least does remain for the time being in the andession of the government that we're not going to move to a different system in which the government doesn't have possession. the argument frequently arises, possibly require any kind of a court order as a condition precedent for querying base, even where you've got u.s. citizens involved in the quer i, because take too much time. do you know of any reason why the should necessarily be

case? or why that would unavoidably be the case, why we couldn't get creatingat by perhaps additional fisa court positions? whollyind that unconvincing. or view is that there are practical realities if you're add the burden to the court, you've got to add judges or magistrates if necessary. there's no reason why the argument about getting a court order for a query of the metadata is any more impossible than to get a search warrant to search a home. is what we dothis all the time, and there are great protections in having oversee this and there's no good reason why this should not be adopted in this context well. >> thank you, professor. >> senator franken? mr. chairman. and thank you gentlemen for the support. i think it will be a real help we work to improve our privacy and surveillance laws. of your report you wrote, quote, a free people can govern themselves only if they

have access to the information that they need to make wise policy.s about public i couldn't agree with you more, and right now the american people don't have the toormation that they need make up their own minds about these programs. bipartisan bill, surveillance transparent sit act support ofat has the 14 of my colleagues, and the strong support of the business broadlyy, which has endorsed the principle of trance parent -- transparency. when i submitted comments to your group, i urged you to support the reforms in my bill your reorezed that the endorses the same measures that are at the core of my bill. i'm going to focus my questions on the trarns parent sit reforms that we agree on.

on government trans-parencc, seven months after the snowden leaks, the government has yet to disclose had theireople have information collected be, this an accident, under current law the american government doesn't have to do this. theill would force government to annually disclose an estimate of the number of had their have information collected by the n.s.a. under each key authority.e your report supports this. for each, for key surveillance authorities, quote, the government should to the extent possible report publicly on the total number of ofuests made and the number individuals whose records have been requested. support this trans-parency reform.

our reporte of consisted with your bill is that sunlight is the best of disinfectants, as justice brandeis said. and that it's very important for american people, unless there's a very strong national security justification on the get a sense of what their government is doing. so the first and foremost goal democratic self government in a free society. [applause] >> thank you very much. thank you. thank you so much. have a seat. a the dawn of our republic, small secret surveillance sonsttee, born out of the of liberty, was established in boston. and the group's members included paul revere. at night they would patrol the

streets, reporting back any signs that the british were preparing raids against america's early patriots. history,t american intelligence has helped secure our country and our freedoms. the civil war, union balloons, reconnaisance, tracked armiese of confederate by counting the number of camp fires. code breakerswo, gave us insights into japanese war plans. marched across europe, he intercepted communications, that helped save lives of his troops. after the war, the rise of the nuclear weapons only increased the need for sustained intelligence gathering. and so in the early days of the cold war, president truman national security agency, or n.s.a., to gave us blochts into the soviet and provide our leaders with information they leaded to avertnt aggression and

catastrophe. evolution, wes benefited from both our constitution and our traditions government. u.s. intelligence agencies were anchored in a system of checks and balances. with oversight from elected protections for ordinary citizens. totalitarian states like east germany offered a cautionary tale of what could uncheckedn vast surveillance turned citizens persecuteders and people for what they said in the privacy of their own homes. fact, even the united states proved not to be immune to the of surveillance in the 1960's the government spied on civil rights leaders and critics of the vietnam war. to thesey in response revelations, additional laws were established in the 1970's

that our intelligence capabilities could not be citizens.ainst our in the long twilight struggle beenst communism, we had reminded that the very liberties that we sought to preserve could sacrificed at the altar of national security. of the soviet union left america without a competing superpower, emerging threats groups and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction place new and in ways more complicated demands on our intelligence agencies. globalization and the internet made these threats more acute, borders andy erased empowered individuals to project great violence, as well as great good. over these new threats raised new policynd questions. for while few doubt the spieling on -- spying on hostile states, our

was not fullyaws adapted to prevent attacks by terrorist individuals acting on own or act acing in small onologically driven groups behalf of a foreign power. the horror of september 11 issues to theese fore. spectrum, political america recognized that we had to adopt to a world in which a in a basementbit and our electric grid could be shut down by operators an ocean away. we were shaken by the signs we missed leading up to the attacks. hijackers had made phone calls to known extremists and places. to suspicious so we demanded that our intelligence community improve its capabilities, and that law enforcement change practices to preventing attacks before they happen than

after anng terrorists attack. to overstate the transformation america's intelligence community had to go through after 9/11. needed toes suddenly do far more than the traditional mission of monitoring hostile gathering information for policy makers. instead they were now asked to identify and target plotters in some of the most remote parts of and to anticipate the actions of networks that by their very nature could not be easily penetrated with spies or informants. and it is a testimony to the hard work and dedication of the of our women intelligence community that over the past decade, we've made enormous strides in fulfilling mission. today new capabilities allow intelligence agencies to track in contactrist is in

with and follow the trail of his travel or his funding. be laws allow information to collected and shared more quickly. and effectively between federal and local lawtate enforcement. relationships with foreign intelligence services have expanded and our capacity to cyber attacks have been strengthened. taken together, these efforts multiple attacks and saved innocent lives. not just here in the united states. but around the globe. and yet, in our rush to respond real and novel set of governmente risk of overreach, the possibility that we lose some of our core oferties in pursuit security, also became more .ronounced we saw in the immediate

aftermath of 9/11 our government in enhanced interrogation techniques that values.cted our as a senator i was critical of several practices, such as wiretaps.s and all too often, new instituted were debate.adequate public through a combination of action by the courts, increased oversight, and adjustments by the previous thenistration, some of worst excesses that emerged after 9/11 were curbed by the office.ook but a variety of factors have continued to complicate america's efforts to both defend our nation and uphold our civil liberties. same technological advances that allow u.s. intelligence agencies to cell in an al qaeda yemen or an e-mail between two

mean that manyo routine communications around reach.ld are within our and at a time when more and more of our lives are digital, that prospect is disquieting for all of us. second, the combination of increased digital information computersul super offers intelligence agencies the possibility of sifting through amounts of bulk data to pursuey patterns or leads that may thwart impending threats. it's a powerful tool. but the government collection and storage of such bulk data potential for abuse. the legal safe guards that restrict surveillance against u.s. persons without a do not apply to foreign persons overseas. unique to america. few if any spy agencies around

the world constrain their activities beyond their own borders. of the whole point intelligence is to obtain information that is not publicly available. but america's capabilities are unique. and the power of new technologies means that there technicaland fewer do.traints on what ke can that places a special obligation on us to ask tough questions about what we should do. intelligence agencies cannot function without workcy, which makes their less subject to public debate. an inevitable bias, not only within the intelligence community, but among all of us are responsible for national security to collect more world.tion about the not less. ofin the absence

institutional requirements for regular debate and oversight ast is public as well private or classified, the of government overreach becomes more acute. and is particularly true when surveillance technology and our reliance on digital information evolving much faster than our laws. for all these reasons, i maintained a healthy skepticism toward our surveillance programs after i became president. i ordered that our programs be securityby my national team and our lawyers, and in some cases i ordered changes in business. we increased oversight and auditing, including new at compliance.d improved rules were proposed by and approvedt bring the foreign intelligence surveillance court. and we sought to keep congress

these activities. what i did not do is stop these programs wholesale. not only because i felt that but made us more secure, also because nothing in that initial review and nothing that learned since indicated that our intelligence community has sought to violate the law or is cavalier about the civil liberties of their fellow citizens. to the contrary, in an extraordinarily difficult job, one in which actions are second guessed, success is unreported, and failure can be catastrophic, men and women of the intelligence community including n.s.a. consistently follow protocols designed to protect of ordinary people. they're not abusing authorities in order to listen to your private phone calls or read your

e-mails. when mistakes are made, which is inevitable in any large and complicated human enterprise, they correct those mistakes. in obscurity, often unable to discuss their work and friends,ily the men and women at the n.s.a. another 9/11 or massive cyber attack occurs, they will be asked by congress why they failed to dots.t the what sustains those who work at n.s.a. and our other intelligence agencies through these pressures is the knowledge that their professionalism and dedication a central role in the nation.of our now, to say that our intelligence community followed and is staffed by patriots is not to suggest that my administration felt complacent about the potential impact of these

programs. office ins who hold america have a responsibility to our constitution. and while i was confident in the those who lead our intelligence community, it was to me in observing our intelligence operations on a regular bases that change in our technological abilities were raising new questions about the privacy safe guards currently in place. moreover, after an extended review of our use of drones in the fight against terrorist networks, i believed a fresh of our surveillance programs was a necessary next step in our effort to get off the open-ended war footing that 9/11.ntained since for these reasons i indicated in a speech at the national defense may that weast needed a more robust public discussion about the balance between security and liberty.

not know atat i did the time is that within weeks of my speech an avalanche of disclosures would spark controversies at home and abroad that have continued to day. given the fact of an open investigation, i'm not going to dwell on mr. snowden's actions motivations, i will say that our nation's defense in part on the fidelity of those entrusted with our secrets. if any individual who objects to government policy can take it publiclyr own hands to disclose classified information, not be able to keep our people safe, or conduct policy. moreover, the sensational way in these disclosures have come out has often shed more heat than light. to ourevealing methods adversaries that could impact our operations in ways that we

may not fully understand for to come. here,less of how we got though, the task before us now repairing than simply the damage done to our operations, or preventing more disclosures from taking place in future. instead, we have to make some how tont decisions about protect ourselves and sustain our leadership in the world the civillding liberties and privacy protections that our ideals and require.itution we need to do so not only right, but because the challenges posed by threats proliferation and and cyber attacks are not going away any time soon. to continue to be a major problem. for our intelligence community to be effective over the long haul, we must maintain the trust american people and world.around the

this effort will not be overnight. and given the pace of technological change, we theldn't expect this to be last time america has this debate. but i want the american people that the work has begun. last six months i created an outside review group on intelligence and communications technologies to recommendations for reform. i consulted with the privacy and oversight board, created by congress. i've listened to foreign advocates andacy industry leaders. my administration has spent countless hours considering how to approach intelligence in this diffuse threats and revolution.l so, before outlining specific changes that i've ordered, let few broad observations that have emerged from this

process. first, everyone who has looked these problems, including programs,f existing recognizes that we have real enemies and threats and that serves a vital role in confronting them. cannot prevent terrorist attacks or cyber threats without to penetratety digital communications. unravel a's to terrorist plot, to intercept mal wear that targets the stock airange, to make sure traffic control systems are not ensure that or to hackers do not empty your bank accounts. we are expected to protect the american people that requires us to have capabilities in this field. cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence

agencies. there's a reason why black berries and iphones are not allowed in the white house situation room. we know that the intelligence services of other countries, feigning some who surprise over the snowden disclosures, are constantly government and private sector networks in listenating programs to to our conversations and intercept our e-mails and compromise our systems. that.w meanwhile, the number of countries including some who the loudly criticized n.s.a. privately acknowledge that america has special responsibilities as the world's only superpower. that our intelligence capabilities are critical to meeting these responsibilities and that they themselves have relied on the information we protect their own people. ardent civilas libertarians recognize the need for robust intelligence

withilities, those responsibilities for our national security readily acknowledge the potential for intelligence capabilities advance, and more and more private information is digitized. after all the folks at n.s.a. and other intelligence agencies neighbors, they're our friends and family. bankve got the electronic and medical records like everybody else. and have kids on facebook instagram. and they know more than most of vulnerabilities to privacy that exist in a world where transactions are recorded messagesl and text and are stored. and even our movements can throughngly be tracked the g.p.s. on our phones. recognition was a by all who participated in these reviews that the challenges to privacy do not come from government alone. corporations of all shapes and sizes track what you buy, store use itlyze our data, and

for commercial purposes. that's how those targeted ads your computer and your smart phone periodically. of us understand that the standards for government higher.ance must be given the unique power of the state, it is not enough for say trust us, we won't abuse the data we collect. has too many examples when that trust has been breached. our system of government is bit the premise that our liberty cannot depend on the good power.ons of those in it depends on the law could power.in those in i make these observations to the basic values of most americans when it comes to questions of surveillance and converge a lot more than the crude characterizations that have emerged over the last months. those who are troubled by our

existing programs are not repeating the whoedy of 9/11, and those defend these programs are not dismissive of civil liberties. the challenge is getting the details right and that is not simple. in fact, during the dogs of our reminded've often myself i would not be where i am today were it not for the likege of dissidents dr. king who were spied upon by government. and as president, a president intelligence every morning, i also can't help by be beinded that america must vigilant in the face of threats. now, fortunately by focusing on facts and specifics rather than hypotheticals, this review process has given me and hopefully the american some clear direction for change. and today i can announce a

andes of concrete substantial reforms that my administration intends to adopt administratively or will seek to cod file with -- codify with congress. first, i have approved a new directive for our signal intelligence activities both at home and abroad. this guidance will strengthen executive branch oversight of activities.ence it will ensure that we take into account our security also ournts, but alliances, our trade and investment relationships including the concerns of companies, and our commitment to privacy and basic liberties. and we will review decisions prioritiesligence and sensitive targets on an annual basis so that our actions scrutinized by my senior national security team. second, we will reform programs and procedures in place to

greater transparency to our surveillance activities and safeguards that protect the privacy of u.s. persons. since we began this review, including the information being today, we've declassified over 40 opinions and orders of the foreign intelligence surveillance court, which provides judicial review sensitive our most intelligence activities, including the section 702 program targeting foreign and theals overseas section 215, telephone meltadata program. going forward i'm directing the director of national intelligence, in consultation with the attorney general, to annually review for the purposes declassification, any future opinions of the court with broad implications, and to report to me and to congress on efforts. to ensure that the court hears a

privacyrange of perspectives, i'm also calling on congress to authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates from outside anernment to provide independent voice in significant cases before the foreign surveillance court. will provide additional protections for activities conducted under which allows the government to intercept the communications of foreign targets overseas who have information that's important for security.al specifically i'm asking the n. i. togeneral and d. institute reforms that place additional restrictions on to retain,s ability search and use in criminal cases communications between americans and foreign citizens incidentally collected under section 702.

investigating threats, the f.b.i. also relies on what's called national letters, which can require companies to provide limited information to the government without disclosing the orders to the subject of the investigation. these are cases in which it's that the subject of the investigation, such as a spy, isn'trrorist or tipped off. but we can and should be more in how government authority. i've therefore directed the attorney general to amend how we letters sol security that this secrecy will not be indefinite. so that it will determine nait within a fixed time, unless the a realent demonstrates need for further secrecy. will also enable communications providers to make public more information than

about the orders that they have received to provide data to the government. this brings me to the program the mostgenerated controversy these past few months. the bulk collection of telephone records under section 215. what i said when this story first broke. does not involve the content of phone calls or makinges of people calls. a record ofrovides phone numbers and the times and calls.of queryied that can be we have a reason al suspicion that a particular number is linked to a terrorist organization. why is this necessary?

grew out of a desire to address a gap identified after 9/11. 9/11 hijackers, mend ar, made a phone call from san diego to a known safe house in yemen. n.s.a. saw that call. but it could not see that the call was coming from an already in the united states. meltadata program under section 215 was designed to map the communications of terrorists so we can see who they may be in contact with as possible. and this capability could also prove valuable in a crisis, for example if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and law racing tot is determine whether a network is poised to conduct additional essence.time is of the being able to quickly review connections to assess whether a network exists is effort. to that

program does not involve the n.s.a. examining the phone americans.ordinary rather it consolidates these thatds into a data base the government can query if it lead.specific a consolidation of phone records already companies retain for business purposes. review group turned up no indications that this data base been intentionally abused. and i believe it is important that thisapability program is designed to meet is .reserved having said that, i believe right to point out that without proper safeguards, of program could be used to yield more information about our private lives and open

door to more intrusive bulk collection programs in the future. out're also right to point that although the telephone bulk collection program was subject foreignight by the intelligence surveillance court and has been reauthorized congress, it has never been subject to vigorous debate. for all these reasons, i believe approach.new i am therefore ordering a thesition that will end section 215 bulk metadata program as it currently exists and establish a mechanism that preserves the capabilities we governmentt the .olding this bulk meltadata this will not be simple. the review group recommended current approach be replaced by one in which the

party,rs, or a third retain the bulk records with government accessing information needed. both of these options pose problems. relying solely on the records of multiple providers, for example, to alteruire companies their procedures in ways that concerns.privacy on the other hand, any third party maintaining a single would beted data base carrying out what's essentially a government function, but with more expense, more legal am big you'dity, potentially less accountability, all of which would have a doubtful impact on confidencepublic that their privacy is being protected. review process, some suggested that we may also be able to preserve the we need to, through a combination of existing informationthat are sharing and recent technological

advances. but more work needs to be done to determine exactly how this work. might because of the challenges involved, i've ordered that the transition away from the existing program will proceed in two steps. effective immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization, instead of the three. and i have directed that the attorney general to work with the foreign intelligence surveillance court so that during this transition period data base can be queried only after a judicial finding or the case of a true emergency. next, step two, i've instructed community andce the attorney general to use this transition period to develop for a new approach that can match the capabilities and section gaps that the

215 program was designed to address without the government metadata itself. they will report back to me, for alternative approaches, before the program comes up for reauthorization on march 28th. and during this period i will consult with the relevant committees in congress to seek their views, and then seek congressional authorization for .he new program as needed now, the reforms i'm proposing today should give the american greater confidence that their rights are being protected, even as our enforcement and law agencies maintain the tools they safe.o keep us i recognize that there are additional issues that require debate, for example some who participated in our review as well as some members of would like to see more sweeping reforms to the use of

letters.security so we have to go to a judge each time before issuing these requests. here i have concerns that we not set a standard for terrorism investigations that is involved inthose crime.gating an ordinary but i agree that greater oversight on the use of these letters may be appropriate, and to work with congress on this issue. who wouldalso those like to see different changes to the fisa court than the ones i've proposed. these issues i'm open to working with congress to ensure that we build a broad consensus how to move forward. and i'm confident that we can shape an approach that meets our while upholding the civil liberties of every american. let me now turn to the separate set of concerns that have been raised overseas. and focus on america's approach

to intelligence collection abroad. as i've indicated, the united uniquehas responsibilities when it comes to intelligence collection. our capabilities help protect our nation but our well.s and our allies as but our efforts will only be if ordinary citizens in other countries have confidence that the united respects their privacy, too. and the leaders of our close allies deserve to know that i want to know what they think about an issue, i'll pick up the phone and call them, rather than turning to surveillance. in other words, just as we balance security and privacy at home, our global leadership demands that we balance our security requirements against the trusto maintain and cooperation among people and world. around the for that reason, the new

presidential directive that i've issued today will clearly prescribe what we do and do not do when it comes to our overseas surveillance. to begin with, the directive makes clear that the united signalsnly uses intelligence for legitimate national security purposes and purpose of indiscriminately reviewing e-mails or phone calls of ordinary folks. i've also made it clear that the united states does not collect to suppress criticism or dissent, nor do we collect intelligence to people on the basis of their race or gender or sexual orientation or religious beliefs. we do not collect intelligence to provide a competitive u.s. companies or sectors.ercial and in terms of our bulk collection of signals intelligence, u.s. intelligence agencies will only use such data

specific security requirements. counterintelligence, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, cyber security, force protection for troops and our allies, and combating transnational crime .ncluding sanctions evasion in this directive, i have taken the unprecedented step of extending certain protections that we have for the american overseas.people i've directed the d. n. i. in consultation with the attorney to develop these safeguards, which will limit the duration that we can hold while alsoformation restricting the use of this information. the bottom line is that people around the world, regardless of their nationality, should know that the united states is not spying on ordinary people who threaten our national security.

privacyake their concerns into account in our procedures. this applies to foreign leaders well. given the understandable attention that this issue has received, i've made clear to the community that unless there is a compelling national security purpose, we not monitor the communications of heads of state and government of our close allies.and and i've instructed my national security team, as well as the community, to work with foreign counterparts to deepen our coordination and that rebuildn ways forward.ng now, let me be clear. our intelligence agencies will continue to gather information about the intentions of governments, as opposed to ordinary citizens, around the world. in the same way that the intelligence services of every nation does. we will not apologize simply

morese our services may be effective. but heads of state and government with whom we work closely and on whose cooperation feel confidentd that we are treating them as real partners. changes i've ordered do that. finally, to make sure that we follow through on all these reforms, i'm making some important changes to allow our -- our government is organized. the state department will designate a senior officer to diplomacy onr issues related to technology and signals intelligence. we will appoint a senior official at the white house to privacyt the new safeguards that i've announced today. i will devote the resources to centralize and improve the process we use to handle foreign legal assistance, keeping our high standards for privacy while helping foreign

andners fight crime terrorism. asked my counselor, ahn podesta, to lead comprehensive review of bigda that and privacy. group will consist of government officials who along with the council on science and technology will reach out to nothingseserts, tech and business leaders and look at how the challenges inhesht in bigda that are being confronted by both the public and private sectors. can forge international norms on how to manage this data. and how we can continue to the free flow of information in ways that are andistent with both privacy security. for ultimately what's at stake debate goes far beyond a few months of headlines or

passing tensions in our foreign policy. when you cut through the noise, at stake is how we remain true to who we are in a that is remaking itself as speeds. whether it's the ability of individuals to communicate access information that would have once filled every great library in every or toy in the world, forge bonds with people on the globe,ide of the technology is remaking what is possible for individuals and for institutions and for the international order. reforms that i've announced will point us in a new direction, i am mindful that more work will be needed in the future. one thing i'm certain of, this stronger.l make us and i also know that in this of change the united states

lead.rica will have to it may seem sometimes that america is being held to a standard. and i'll admit the readiness of the worst motives by our government can be .rustrating no one expects china to have an open debate about their programs.ce or russia to take privacy concerns of citizens in other places into account. let's remember, we are held to a different standard precisely because we have been the forefront of defending personal privacy and human .ignity as the nation that developed the expects ushe world to ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for empowerment, not control.t

having faced down the dangers of fascism andism and communism, the world expects us principlep for the that every person has the right to think and write and form relationships freely. because individual freedom is the wellspring of human progress. make us who we are. and because of the strength of democracy, we should not expectations.high ourmore than two centuries, constitution has weathered every type of change because we've it. willing to defend and because we've been willing to question the actions that been taken in its defense. is no different. i believe we can meet high

expectations. together let us chart a way the life of secures our nation while preserving the liberties that make our nation for. fighting thank you, god bless you, may of bless the united states america. [applause] thank you. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute]

>> you've just seen the president live here on c-span. we'd like your reaction, can you phone your screen the numbers if you're listening on the radio. if you're a g.o.p. partisan give at 202-583-3886. if you don't know which side like to come down on this one, that's fine too. 202-585-3887.

you can also get a hold of us on facebook.com/cspan. twitter. the hash tag is cspan chat. california.in let's go over to milton in san jose. c-span.n what did you think? >> yes, day watch the speech and disappointed both that the reforms seemed more of a band aid than substantive, and there are so many legal qualifiers about when the and wordske place like insignificant cases or in criminal cases or where there's a significant threat. there's always these qualifiers, concern is that he didn't address how i feel the n.s.a. has been polluting the internet. falsee cases putting out back door access -- >> milton, what would you have liked to have